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This  study  examines  the  European  Union  (EU)  gas  supplies,  particularly  those 
coming from the Russian Federation. The increasing EU dependency upon Russian 
gas and recent gas disruptions make European leaders think about securitizing gas 
supplies issue.
The aim of the thesis is to analyse consequences of securitization of the gas supplies 
in  the  EU through  scrutinizing  Russian  foreign  policy  in  the  energy sphere.  The 
following questions are posed: What are the preconditions of politicization process of 
the energy supply issue in the EU? What are the main features of Russian policy in 
the  area  of  gas  supplies  to  the  EU?  What  are  the  possible  consequences  of 
securitization of the energy supply in the EU? 
The theoretical framework assumes that securitization, being a negative process, may 
lead to ‘energy dilemma’ a situation when an energy consumer wants to diversify its 
energy supplies and a supplier wants to block consumer’s diversification attempts.
The study is conducted with a case study method research.  The results  show that 
politicization of energy supplies in the EU stimulated aggressive and decisive Russian 
foreign policy in the sphere of energy directed on depriving the EU of possibilities to 
diversify its energy supplies. Securitization and extraordinary measures may lead to 
the increase of confrontation between the EU and Russia in the sphere of energy 
supplies. This confirms the theory.
Keywords: Securitization,  Security of Supply,  Security of Demand, Gas Supplies, 
the European Union, the Russian Federation.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have seen increasing attention being paid to the issue of energy 
security. There has certainly been recognition that energy security is a concern. 
Problems  linked  with  the  issue  are  now  deliberated  at  high-level  political 
meetings between heads of state. In other words, the trade in energy supplies is no 
longer merely a question of economics but also become political.  Viewed on a 
global level, the issue of energy security has increasing importance due to the fact 
that the world’s energy resources are limited and that demand is increasing along 
with the world population and the development of new technologies.
1.1 Background
The EU made itself more dependent upon natural gas during the past thirty 
years.1 Europe’s dependence on Russian gas has become a central  issue in the 
European  Union’s  internal  debates  about  its  relationship  with  Russia  and  its 
energy policy (Noel 2008: 1). The recent war between Georgia and Russia has 
added a sense of urgency to the EU’s search for a better Russian policy, fuelling 
fears that Moscow might use its power as a major energy supplier to blackmail 
Europeans  into submission.  Consumption  of  natural  gas has  grown steadily  in 
Europe over the past 40 years.2 With 1.3% of world natural gas reserves – mostly 
in the North Sea – and a general depletion of the fields, slightly over one third of 
natural gas consumed in Europe is produced domestically (Checchi et al 2009:4). 
The remainder needs to be imported from Russia (45% of all natural gas imports), 
from Norway (24%), from Algeria (21%), and some 11% from Nigeria, Libya, 
Egypt, Qatar and Oman (Ibid). EU domestic gas production reached its peak in 
1 In 1980 oil took 47% in EU primary energy consumption while natural gas share was only 14%. 
In 2006 the share of oil and gas was 41% and 25% respectively (BP 2007).
2 Gas consumption as a proportion of energy use in the EU has grown from 4% in 1965 to 25% in 
2005 (Noel 2008: 3). Between 1990 and 2005, a 41% increase in natural gas consumption was 
observed at EU-27 level (Eurostat 2007: 37).
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1996 entering a period of ‘pumping plateau’ and long-term decline exacerbated by 
the progressive exhaustion of  off-shore fields  in  the North Sea (Checchi  et  al 
2009: 15). The UK potential has largely been explored and, although some fields 
have been put on-stream in the past ten years, a future decline in production seems 
irreversible (IEA 2004: 394). Apart from Norway, most countries in the rest of 
Europe will experience a gradual decline in gas reserves. Natural gas production 
in Norway has increased by 60% in the first half of this decade and is expected to 
continue  to  grow substantially  up to  2010;  thereafter  it  will  probably  reach  a 
steady phase (IEA 2006: 32). The EU’s natural gas production in 2030 will be less 
than 30% of today’s production (Checchi et al 2009: 15, Percebois 2008: 34).
 Since the early 1980s, and particularly over the past decade, import growth 
from other countries has outpaced that from Russia. But despite that since 1990, 
80% of the growth in European gas imports has originated from countries other 
than Russia, especially Norway, Algeria, Nigeria and middle eastern countries and 
accordingly, Russia’s share of EU gas imports has declined sharply, from 75% in 
1990 to just over 45% today, it remains the largest exporter of gas to the EU, with 
total annual exports of 130 bcm today (Noel 2008: 5). 3 This inter-dependency is 
the result of several decades of relations that were created by the EU’s strategic 
decision to use natural gas because it is a form of energy that minimizes damage 
to the environment (Ibid). Both oil and coal have been replaced by natural gas in 
power generation for economic, efficiency and environmental reasons: the Kyoto 
protocol  and  EU  directives  foster  more  efficient  and  cleaner  energy  policies 
(Gilardoni 2008: 41-42). Natural gas is the cleanest fossil fuel (GERG 2007: 1).4 
3 The old 15 member states (EU15) account for 86% of EU gas consumption (Noel 2008: 5). The 
UK, Germany and Italy each consume more gas alone than the 12 new member states (NMS) 
combined. Yet Russian gas represents, on average, just 20% of the EU15 primary gas supply, and 
more  than  50%  of  supply  only  in  Finland,  Greece  and  Austria.  Conversely,  all  ten  eastern 
European NMS, apart from Romania, rely on Russia for at least 50% of their gas. For six of them 
the figure is 80% or more. It is predicted that by 2020 the consumption of Russian gas will have 
risen to 70% (Radoman 2007: 39).
4 It should be recalled that a ‘coal kWh’ contains 900 g of CO2 compared with 410 g for a ‘natural 
gas kWh’and 710 g for an ‘oil kWh’ (Percebois 2008: 34). 
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1.2 Problem Formulation
The  dependency  of  the  EU  upon  the  Russian  Federation  gas  supplies, 
growing natural gas consumption in the EU and recent disruptions in gas supplies 
connected with the transit country of Ukraine can easily lead to securitization of 
gas supplies in the EU. Since securitization can be regarded as a negative process 
(Buzan et al 1998: 29) it  also can result in negative consequences for the EU. 
Thus, the problem is uncertainty about consequences of securitization of the gas 
supplies issue in the EU.
1.3 Purpose
Thus, we are going to scrutinize the process of securitization of the energy 
supply issue in the EU focusing on its possible consequences. The main question 
of the work is: “Should the EU securitize an energy supply issue?”
To  answer  this  question  it  is  necessary  to  analyse  the  development  of 
Russian energy supply policy towards the EU. Therefore, we are also going to 
answer three additional questions:
• What are the preconditions of politicization process of the energy 
supply in the EU? 
• What  are  the  main  features  of  Russian  policy  in  the  area  of  gas 
supplies to the EU?
• And finally what are the possible consequences of securitization of 
the energy supply in the EU? 
1.4 Scope and Limitations
The  EU consumes  energy  in  different  forms  and  from different  sources. 
There are four main forms: oil, gas, coal and nuclear energy. In this study only 
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natural gas usage will be considered. This limitation can be explained by several 
factors. 
The first is that natural gas is becoming more popular form of energy in the 
EU as well as in the world.  Gas consumption grew by 3.1% in 2007, the only 
fossil fuel where growth accelerated (BP 2008: 9). In the EU 25 natural gas is the 
only  primary  energy  vector  that  has  persistently  increased  its  share  (the  only 
exception  is  2006,  but  with  a  minimum  drop).  It  overtook  coal  in  1996  and 
became in  2006 the  second energy carrier  after  oil  taking  20% of  EU energy 
consumption. Oil remains the first source, though mainly used for transportation, 
but its share fell from 47% in 1980 to 41% in 2006 (Gilardoni 2008: 40-41). The 
coal usage is also characterized by constant decrease.
The second reason is the rising demand for natural gas in the EU. In absolute 
terms, EU 25 natural gas demand grew from 233 bcm in 1980 to 467 bcm in 2006. 
Estimates of future demand foresee further growth: 579 bcm in 2010, 718 bcm in 
2020 and 753 bcm in 2030 (Gilardoni 2008: 42). In the Directorate-General for 
Energy  and  Transport  (DG  TREN)  reference  scenario  published  in  2006,  for 
example,  the EU natural  gas demand was forecasted to grow by 24% between 
2005 and 2030, while in 2008, DG TREN reduced the expected demand growth to 
16% (Checchi et al 2009: 14).
 The  third  reason  is  recent  disruptions  in  natural  gas  supplies  from the 
Russian Federation to the EU which make the problem relevant and vital for the 
EU. The share of EU gas consumption covered by Russian imports grew rapidly 
in the 1970s and 1980s, peaking at 30% in the early 1990s before stabilizing at 
about 25% in 2006. Yet as a share of Europe’s primary energy consumption, gas 
imports from Russia have stabilized since 1990 at around 6.5%. In other words, 
93.5%  of  the  energy  consumed  in  Europe  is  covered  by  sources  other  than 
Russian gas. Despite all these things, in 2005 the EU imported almost half (49%) 
of foreign gas by pipeline from the Russian Federation (Drollas 2008). Russia 
remains the largest exporter of gas to the EU, taking 25.5% in 2006 of the EU gas 
supply which makes disruption in gas supplies extremely undesirable (Noel 2008: 
2). One may argue that oil supplies are of the same importance for the EU but it’s 
not right. Europe is highly dependent on Russian crude oil and petroleum products 
but firstly, there were no major problems since 2006, when Russia turned off the 
oil taps to Lithuania; more recently it did the same to the Czech Republic. These 
4
were regrettable events, but they have had very limited, if any, lasting impact on 
the energy supply of these two countries or their overall economic welfare (Noel 
2008: 2). Secondly, while the gas relationship has significant implications for the 
EU-Russia political relations, this is not true for oil – even in the case of those EU 
countries  that  are  highly  reliant  on  Russia  for  supply  of  crude  oil  or  refined 
products.  The reason for this  lies  in the different  structures of the oil  and gas 
market and the varying nature of the products. Oil is a highly fungible commodity 
that can be transported by pipelines, tankers, barges, railway and trucks; and it is 
traded on a deep and liquid global market in which Europe is fully integrated. In 
the case of a supply disruption, a refinery or large consumer can almost invariably 
turn to the spot (short-term) market. Furthermore, as Pierre Noel argues, the cost 
of storing oil  products  is  only a fraction of that  for natural  gas,  which means 
importers with limited oil supply diversity have a strong incentive to maintain big 
inventories (or can be forced to do so by regulation) (Noel 2008: 3). It should be 
also  noted  that  terms  ‘energy  supplies’  and  ‘gas  supplies’  are  used 
interchangeably in this paper. 
There  is  also  time  limitation  in  the  work.  Obviously,  it  is  impossible  to 
consider EU gas supply security from the very start. Thus, EU energy security is 
analyzed starting from 1990-91. The reason for that is the collapse of the USSR 
which entailed lots of changes on the post-soviet area, namely  serious conflicts 
between Russia and gas transit countries (Baltic countries, Ukraine and Belarus), 
which resulted in disruption in gas supplies to the EU (Checchi et al 2009: 20).
The final limitation in the paper implies the EU as the whole entity. We do 
not consider any EU member state separately despite the fact that the gas market 
in the EU based on bilateral agreements between each member state and Russia. 
The  reason  for  that  are  common  supplies.  When  disruptions  in  gas  supplies 
emerge it influences all Russian gas consuming countries in the EU without any 
exceptions. Thus, the question is vital for the EU entirely.
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1.5 Disposition
The work consists of six chapters. The first chapter introduces the purpose of 
the  thesis  and  outlines  the  main  questions.  The  second  chapter  explains  the 
method that was used in the process of writing. It also presents literature overview 
and information about validity and reliability. In the third chapter main theoretical 
conceptions on securitization and security are described as well as elaborations on 
theoretical interconnections between security of demand and security of supply. 
Chapter  four  contains  the  analysis.  In  this  chapter  the  answers  to  the  posed 
questions can be found. The fifth chapter summarizes and presents conclusions of 
the analysis.  And the chapter number  six is  devoted to suggestions for further 
research.
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2. Methodology
2.1 Literature
In order to answer the posed questions we have collected and analysed a 
large amount of material. To create a theoretical framework section we have used 
a  number  of  articles  and books  written  by  prominent  scholars  in  the  field  of 
security studies. The main theoretical sources are “Security: a new framework for 
analysis” written by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, “On Security” 
edited by  Ronnie D. Lipschutz and “Contemporary Security Studies” edited by 
Allan Collins. These books were used to explain securitization theory. We also 
used  papers  that  criticize  securitization  theory,  namely  by  Rita  Taureck 
“Securitization theory and securitization studies”. To explain and to some degree 
elaborate on energy security – security of supply and security of demand, we also 
used “Energy Security” written by Sascha Muller-Kraenner.
As for analysis, here besides articles and books we also used speeches made 
by different politicians like European Commission Presidents, Russian Presidents 
and so on. Among the articles we must mention “Securitization of Energy as a 
Prelude to Energy Security Dilemma”  by Jelena Radoman which gave us initial 
idea of the issue as well as “Tackling Dependency: The EU and its energy security 
challenges” written by Robert L. Larsson. Among books we must mention the one 
written by Adrian Hyde-Price “European Security in the Twenty-First Century: 
The Challenge of Multipolarity”.
2.2 Case study method
The paper is a typical single case study of securitization of energy supplies 
issue, namely securitization of natural gas supplies in the EU. This case can be 
regarded as ‘most-likely’ because of traditionally not very warm relations between 
EU and Russia. Securitization process might have negative consequences that can 
easily contribute to confrontation between these countries. At the same time, the 
7
case can be regarded as a ‘least-likely’ case since the EU exports high volumes of 
gas from Russia. This makes Russia dependable upon the EU as a consumer and 
decreases  chances  for  securitization’s  negative  effects  (Eckstein  2000:  149, 
Schafer and Walker 2006: 565). 
One should bear in mind though, that this is a case study about energy supply 
security in the EU and the results of this examination may not be applicable to 
other regions of the world. In other words, almost no generalisation is possible 
(Gomm et al 2000: 98-99). However, the scope of the work is that its results may 
serve as a foundation for further research of the role of securitization in other 
regions  or  of  other  kinds  of  fuels.  This  thesis  might  also  be  considered  as  a 
contribution  to  the  concept  of  securitization  that  is  potentially  can be used in 
practice by every international actor.
Due to the thesis’s purpose and questions, a case study method is the most 
appropriate one to use. Robert Yin argues that:
“[h]ow and why questions are explanatory and likely to lead to the use of case 
studies, histories, experiments as the preferred research strategies. This is because 
such questions deal with operational links needing to be traced over time, rather 
than mere frequencies or incidence” (Yin 2003: 6).
Our aim is to take a look into a policy field and define how securitisation of 
gas supplies can contribute to the problem of its disruption. We are also trying to 
explain why the securitisation in a particular case leads to certain consequences 
and not to other. It includes searching for meaning, motives and reasons.
Case study method allows us  to  scrutinise  the  processes explaining  them 
rather  than  describing  as  most  of  quantitative  methods  do.  Some  process 
(negotiation, institutional changes) cannot be explained by data simply because no 
meaningful data exist to fulfil this task. The method we have chosen concentrates 
on the one case narrowing the possible conclusion and leaving almost no place for 
generalisation but instead it preserves and reports large amount of material about 
the case comparatively to statistical method covering more or less the same case 
(Odell 2004: 67-68). However, the fact that we are using some statistical data in 
the  work  makes  the  former  more  suitable  for  making  generalisation.  In  other 
words case study method is suitable to the issue being analyzed since it allows 
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construction of historical and detailed explanations of particular cases(s) through 
in-depth examination (Kacowicz 2004: 108).
2.3 Validity and reliability
The question of validity can be summarized as a question of whether the 
researches see what they think they see (Flick 2006: 371). Case study method is 
often criticized for the lack of objectivity. The authors of the paper are Ukrainians 
and this condition makes it even more difficult to talk about objectivity of the 
work, since Ukraine is one of the key actors in the issue. But being aware of 
validity’s  importance  we  tried  to  present  facts  and  conduct  the  analysis  as 
objective  as  possible.  Few  sources  among  the  used  literature  are  written  by 
Ukrainian authors. However, one should always be aware that validity is a thing 
that is never complete, this work is largely based on facts rather than on personal 
opinions.
The method that is chosen might negatively affect validity of the paper since 
it is difficult to know how accurately and neutrally selected events represent the 
case the theory refers to (Odell 2004: 67-68). We tried to avoid this potential trap 
by close  cooperation  and discussion  of  the  analysis  we have  done.  Trying  to 
criticize  each  other’s  view  we  almost  eliminated  the  possibility  of  narrow 
definition of the issue.
As  for  reliability,  which  according  to  Uwe  Flick  means  a  possibility  of 
having the same results while using a particular method (Flick 2006: 369), we 
Giving the sufficient amount of information available on the issue and relative 
high degree of its trustworthiness it is possible to argue that the same results can 
be easily obtained with the same method (case study).
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3. Theoretical Framework
3.1 Meaning of Security 
Over the past decade,  the field of security studies has become one of the 
most dynamic and contested areas in International Relations. In particular, it has 
become,  perhaps,  the  primary  forum  in  which  broadly  social  constructivist 
approaches have challenged traditional – largely realist and neorealist – theories 
in the area in which some of the most vibrant new approaches to the analysis of 
international politics are being developed, and the realm in which some of the 
most  engaged  theoretical  debates  are  taking  place  (Williams  2003:  511). 
Fortunately,  there  is  a  consensus  on  what  security  studies  entail,  and  a  short 
definition  that  covers most  of what  scholars  have tried to incorporate  into the 
concept is that ‘it is to do with threats to survival’ (Collins 2007: 2). 
So, what quality makes something a security issue in international relations? 
An  answer  can  be  found  in  the  traditional  military-political  understanding  of 
security. Traditionally the state has been the thing to be secured, what is known as 
the referent object,  and it  has thought security through military might  (Collins 
2007:  2).  In  this  context,  security  is  about  survival.   It  is  when  an  issue  is 
presented  as  posing  an  existential  threat  to  a  designated  referent  object 
(traditionally, but not necessarily, a state, incorporating government, territory, and 
society) (Buzan et al 1998:29). The special nature of security threats justifies the 
use of extraordinary measures to handle them. The invocation of security has been 
the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way 
for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers, to handle existential threats. 
Traditionally, by saying ‘security’, a state representative declares an emergency 
condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a 
threatening development (Buzan et al 1998: 21).
With the end of the Cold War, security studies have re-emerged as well as 
core assumptions about what is to be secured, and how. Debates over the nature 
and  meaning  of  ‘security’  have  become  the  focus  of  renewed  controversy  in 
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security studies. The field has been challenged to consider questions surrounding 
the ‘broadening’ of its agenda to include threats beyond the narrow category of 
state and military security, and to confront the claim that this agenda must also be 
‘deepened’ to include the security concerns of actors ranging from individuals and 
sub-state groups (often now formulated under the category of ‘human security’) to 
global concerns such as the environment that have often been marginalized within 
a traditional state-centric and military conception (Williams 2003: 513).
Obviously, the character of security in international relations is not identical 
to the use of the term in everyday language. Unlike social security,  which has 
strong links to matters of social justice and entitlement, international security is 
firmly  rooted  in  the  traditions  of  power  politics  (Stritzel  2007:  360). For 
Copenhagen School in the face of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver ‘security means 
survival in the face of existential threats’ (Buzan et al 1998: 27). These scholars 
consider  security as the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of 
the game and frames the issue either as a special  kind of politics or as above 
politics (Emmers 2007: 118).
However,  national  security  should  not  be  idealized.  It  works  to  silence 
opposition and has given power holders many opportunities to exploit ‘threats’ for 
domestic  purposes,  to  claim a right  to  handle something  with  less  democratic 
control and constraint. Thus, it is not that ‘the more security the better’. As Buzan 
and Wæver put it, ‘basically, security should be seen as negative, as a failure to 
deal with issues as normal politics’ (Buzan et al 1998: 29). 
In any case, it is neither politically nor analytically helpful to try to define 
‘real security’ outside of the world of politics and to teach the actors to understand 
the term correctly, because different states and nations have different thresholds 
for  defining  a  threat  (Emmers  2007:  121).  It  is  more  relevant  to  grasp  the 
processes  and dynamics  of  securitization,  because  if  one knows who can ‘do’ 
security on what issues and under what conditions, it will sometimes be possible 
to manoeuvre the interaction among actors and thereby curb security dilemmas 
(Buzan et al 1998: 31). 
The theory of ‘securitization’ developed by the Copenhagen School provides 
one of the most innovative, productive, and yet controversial avenues of research 
in  contemporary  security  studies  (Williams  2003:  511).  However,  in  using 
securitization theory,  it is better not to focus on what security is, but rather on 
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what it does – because what security does is equivalent to the meaning of security. 
In Wæver’s words: ‘What we can study is who can ‘do security’ on what issues 
under what conditions – and with what effects?’ (Taureck 2006: 15).
3.2 Securitization Theory
Securitization theory offers one of the most concise and attractive analytical 
tools in critical security studies today (Taureck 2006: 2).  Ole Wæver and Barry 
Buzan, the core of the Copenhagen School, define securitization as a successful 
speech act ‘through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a 
political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent 
object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the 
threat’ (Stritzel 2007: 358).
The defining feature of the Copenhagen School approach to security is the 
fact  that  it  proposes  to  study  security  practices  by  drawing  on  speech  act 
philosophy, assuming that the articulation of security is a crucial form of security 
action. It is this articulation that has the potential to structure the social practices 
that follow. The articulation of ‘security’ entails the claim that something is held 
to pose a threat to a valued referent object that is so existential that it is legitimate 
to move the issue beyond the established games of ‘normal’ politics to deal with it 
by exceptional, i.e. security, methods. This puts an actor in a very strong position 
to deal with an issue as (s)he thinks is appropriate. As Wæver put it, ‘by uttering 
‘security’  a state-representative moves a particular  development  into a specific 
area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to 
block it’ (Wæver 1995: 55). 
So, to briefly summarize what securitization theory is: the main argument of 
securitization  theory  is  that  security  is  a  speech  act,  that  alone  by  uttering 
‘security’ something is being done. ‘It is by labelling something a security issue 
that it becomes one’ (Ibid). A securitizing actor by stating that a particular referent 
object is threatened in its existence claims a right to extraordinary measures to 
ensure the referent objects survival. The issue is then moved out of the sphere of 
normal politics into the realm of emergency politics, where it can be dealt with 
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swiftly  and  without  the  normal  (democratic)  rules  and  regulations  of  policy 
making. For the content of security this means that it has no longer any given 
meaning but  that  it  can  be anything  a  securitizing  actor  says  it  is.  Security  – 
understood in this way – is a social construction, with the meaning of security 
dependent on what is done with it (Taureck 2006: 3).
To  prevent  ‘everything’  from  becoming  a  security  issue,  a  successful 
securitization consists of three steps. These are: (1) identification of existential 
threats; (2) emergency action; and (3) effects on inter-unit relations by breaking 
free of rules (Buzan et al 1998: 6). To present an issue as an existential threat is to 
say that:  ‘If  we do not  tackle  this  problem,  everything  else  will  be irrelevant 
(because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way)’ 
(Buzan et al 1998: 24). This first step towards a successful securitization is called 
a securitizing move. A securitizing move is in theory an option open to any unit 
because only once an actor has convinced an audience (inter-unit relations) of its 
legitimate need to go beyond otherwise binding rules and regulations (emergency 
mode) can we identify a case of securitization. Securitizing move leads directly to 
taking extraordinary measures which will never be taken if the issue remains in 
the sphere of normal politics.
It is important to note that the identification of an issue as an ‘existential 
threat’ is the first conceptual step for any process of securitisation, notably the 
other  two  steps  being  emergency  action  and  effects  on  inter  unit  relations, 
breaking free of rules (Balzacq 2005: 175). This ‘existential threat’ requirement of 
‘securitisation’ means that: ‘security’ is not just any kind of speech-act, not just 
any form of social construction or accomplishment. It is a specific kind of act, 
because  it  calls  for  extraordinary  measures  beyond  routines  and  norms  of 
everyday  politics  (Williams  2003:  514).  ‘Security’  is  thus  a  self-referential 
practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not 
necessarily  because  a  real  existential  threat  exists  but  because  the  issue  is 
presented as such a threat (Buzan et al 1998: 24). 
Although  in  one  sense  securitization  is  a  further  intensification  of 
politicization (thus usually making an even stronger role for the state), in another 
sense it is opposed to politicization. Politicization means to make an issue appear 
to be open, a matter of choice, something that is decided upon and that therefore 
entails responsibility, in contrast to issues that either could not be different (laws 
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of nature) or should not be put under political control (free economy, the private 
sphere,  matters  for  expert  decision).  By  contrast,  securitization  on  the 
international level (although often not on a domestic one) means to present an 
issue as urgent and existential, as so important that it should not be exposed to the 
normal  haggling of politics but should be dealt  with decisively by top leaders 
prior to other issues (Emmers 2007: 117).
Thus, securitization, like politicization, has to be understood as an essentially 
intersubjective process. To study securitization is to study the power politics of a 
concept. A security argument always involves two predictions: what will happen 
if we do not take ‘security actions’ (the threat), and what will happen if we do 
(how is submitted security policy supposed to work?) (Buzan et al 1998: 32).  
It  is possible to ask with some force whether it is a good idea to make a 
particular issue a security issue, to transfer it to the agenda of panic politics, or 
whether  it  is  better  handled  within  normal  politics  (Taureck  2006:16).  The 
securitization approach serves to underline the responsibility of talking security, 
the responsibility of actors as well as analysts who choose to frame an issue as a 
security issue.  
In practice, securitization is thus far from being open to all units and their 
respective subjective threats. Rather, it is largely based on power and capability 
and therewith the means to socially and politically construct a threat. In this way 
the study of security remains wide, but with restrictions pertaining to ‘who’ can 
securitize it is neither unmanageable nor incoherent. This being said it should be 
noted that Wæver is extremely critical of framing issues in terms of security. For 
him: ‘security should be seen as a negative,  as a failure to deal with issues of 
normal politics’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). Because of this, he favours a strategy of 
desecuritization whereby securitization is reversed and issues are moved out of 
‘the threat – defense sequence and into the ordinary public sphere’ where they can 
be dealt  with in accordance with the rules of the (democratic)  political  system 
(Ibid.). Although this is clearly a normative statement on the part of Wæver, it is 
important to notice that it has no bearing on what securitization theory can do. 
This is so, because securitization and for that matter desecuritization are political 
acts and therefore outside of the securitization theorist’s personal preference.
This  brief  overview  shows  that  securitization  theory  is  not  a  political 
statement  on the part  of the analyst,  but that  securitization theory is  instead a 
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theoretical  tool  of  analysis  with  which  the  analyst  can  trace  incidences  of 
securitization and desecuritization. Securitization theory by itself does not enable 
the analyst to say what security should be/not be. Securitization theory thus seeks 
to answer the question – what does security do? – and little beyond this. In this 
understanding, securitization theory is nothing but a theoretical tool to facilitate 
practical security analysis.
3.3 Energy Security and Energy Dilemma
The concept of energy security evolved from the oil crisis of the 1970s when 
the  OPEC  oil embargo  and  the  Iranian  revolution  threatened  to  cause  price 
increases and quantity shortages for the United States. Since then energy security 
has  been  viewed  in  terms  of  reliable  and  affordable access  to  oil  by  western 
countries that were dependent on oil imports for their energy needs. As natural gas 
became  more  important  in  the  energy  mix,  it  was  included  in  this  thinking. 
However, energy security has still remained predominantly a western concept due 
to  the  dominance  of OECD  (Organization  for  Economic  Co-operation  and 
Development) countries as consumers of the world oil and natural gas production 
(ESMAP 2004).
The  European  Commission  and  the  International  Energy  Agency  define 
energy security as the provision of reasonably priced, reliable end environmentally 
friendly energy (Muller-Kraenner  2008: 1-2).  The International  Energy Agency 
(IEA)  defines  energy security  primarily  in  terms  of  stable  supplies  of  oil  and 
natural gas (IEA 2006).  This would certainly be an acceptable general definition. 
However, energy security can also be defined in the following terms: 1) enabling a 
certain percentage or number of countries to sustain the provisioning or availability 
of  energy  services  for  poverty  reduction  and  economic  growth,  2)  enabling  a 
certain percentage or number of households, businesses and communities to meet 
their  energy  needs  for  consumptive,  productive  or  socially  productive  uses 
(ESMAP 2004).
The  above  stated  definition  of  energy  security  implies  that  a  theoretical 
framework must provide understanding of both the demand and supply side of the 
issue. Security of supply may be defined as the guarantee that all the gas volumes, 
demanded by non-interruptible (firms or protected) customers, will be available at 
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a reasonable price. The following points should be noted: 1) security of supply is 
primarily a concept of physical availability – the gas must be there when required, 
2) nevertheless,  the security of supply is  also tied to contractual  arrangements. 
Some customers may elect to give up security of supply and take the risk of not 
getting the gas when required, 3) finally,  security of supply is also, albeit more 
loosely, tied to a concept of price. Gas must be available at a ‘reasonable’ price – 
not at any price. By definition, if the price is allowed to increase without a limit, 
there  will  always  be  a  sufficiently  high  price  at  which  demand  will  equate  to 
available supplies – but it does not mean that in this case that the security of supply 
is guaranteed.  If  to lift  any restriction on the movement  of prices,  the issue of 
security of supply simply evaporates. Yet how far is it acceptable to allow prices to 
move in order to restrict demand and allocate scarce supplies is a question that can 
only be decided politically, by the government or regulator, or contractually, by the 
parties accepting limits to price increases – not by a theoretical discussion (Luciani 
2004: 2).
Foreign policy analysts are convinced that the increasing nationalisation of 
energy resources and the politicisation of energy management by resource rich 
countries  have made energy security – as in  the 1980s – a  matter  of  national 
security (Yergin 2000). According to them, the market alone is not able to deal 
with the mounting and multi-faceted challenges that energy-consuming countries 
have to face in a globalised world. Energy security therefore requires international 
cooperation, government intervention and military control. Neither of these two 
interpretations  can  be  dismissed,  but  neither  can  capture  the  whole  picture  of 
security of supply. In fact, the economic and the so-called political interpretation 
are  two  sides  of  the  same  coin;  they  complement  each  other  and  both  are 
necessary to explain the challenges as well as the solutions to dealing with the 
security of energy supply in Europe (Checchi et al 2009: 1).
A security dilemma being a base for energy dilemma is created when an 
actor, in an attempt to increase his own security, takes measures which he claims 
are  of  a  defensive nature.  However,  these measures  are  the cause of  fear  and 
suspicion  of  others  who,  due  to  the  general  mistrust  present  in  international 
affairs, perceive the actions to be offensive (Radoman 2007: 43). In a situation in 
which  there  is  interdependency  but  mistrust  it  is  almost  impossible,  but  also 
unnecessary,  to  discover  who  is  responsible  for  the  initiation  of  mutual 
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intimidation.  The politicization  of the  problem of energy supply is  already an 
open field for the appearance of a security dilemma or energy dilemma. However, 
securitizing this issue the actors in energy-dependence chain would irreversibly 
renounce rational and responsible efforts to find a model of relations that would 
achieve energy security, as well as general security (Balzacq 2005: 183). 
The concept of the security dilemma engages with the existential uncertainty 
that lies in all human relations, and especially those taking place in the arena of 
international  politics.  Booth and Wheeler  argue that the security dilemma is  a 
more fundamental concept for security studies than even war and strategy (Booth 
and Wheeler 2008: 3). After defining the meaning of the security dilemma, they 
proceed  to  explore  its  dynamics,  giving  illustrations  from  current  and  future 
dangers.  They argue  that  if  security  studies  are  to  live  up  to  its  name in  the 
twenty-first century, the complex phenomenon of the security dilemma must be 
given a central place in the agenda. 
So,  according  to  them  the  term  ‘security  dilemma’ describes  a  familiar 
predicament experienced by decision-makers in a world already overflowing with 
dilemmas. Despite its ubiquity, their claim is that the concept has been invariably 
misconceived  by academic  theorists,  yet  – properly understood – it  should be 
regarded as the most fundamental concept of all in security studies, and as such 
should be at the centre of a reformed agenda of this field. The security dilemma is 
a  foundational  concept  because,  above  all,  it  engages  with  the  existential 
condition  of  uncertainty that  characterizes  all  human  relations,  not  least  those 
interactions on the biggest and most violent stage of all – international politics 
(Ibid).  In  the  context  of  International  Relations,  the  existential  condition  of 
uncertainty  means  that  governments  (their  decision-makers,  military  planners, 
foreign policy analysts) can never be 100 percent certain about the current and 
future motives and intentions of those able to harm them in a military sense. They 
call this situation one of  unresolvable uncertainty, and see it as the core of the 
predicaments that make up the security dilemma. 
In the sphere of energy, ‘security dilemma’ implies the willingness of one 
side  which  buy energy to  take  measures  to  make  its  energy supplies  secured 
(usually through diversification), while the other side which sells energy tries to 
guarantee security of demand for itself through blocking diversification attempts 
made by the first side. In such a way, political leaders resolve their dilemma of 
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response in a manner that creates a spiral of mutual hostility, when neither wanted 
it,  a  situation  has  developed  which  we  call  the  security  paradox  or  ‘energy 
dilemma’ (Larsson 2007: 61, Booth and Wheeler 2008: 4–5). In other words, two 
or more actors, seeking only to improve their own security, provoke through their 
words or actions an increase of mutual tension, resulting in less security all around 
(Booth and Wheeler 2008: 9). Both actors are not fully confident in each other’s 
reliability. One actor questions the reliability of the other actor as a supplier, the 
former in its turn questions the latter’s reliability as a consumer. Theoretically, if 
the degree of cooperation between these actors is high then the first (consumer) 
appears  to  be  dependable  upon  the  second  actor  (supplier).  If  the  degree  of 
cooperation is low, then the second actor (supplier) cannot be sure about stability 
of the energy market. One may assume that securitization of energy supply by the 
consumer-actor may make supplier actor seek alternative (more reliable) markets 
for selling its energy.
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4 Results
In that section we will present analysis of development of gas supplies to the 
EU from Russia  starting from 1991 when the Soviet  Union dissolved and the 
problems emerged. Results chapter consists of four parts going in chronological 
order. The first part tells about preconditions of politicization of gas supply from 
the RF during 1991-2000. The second section analyzes results of politicization 
process  of  gas  supplies  in  the  EU as  well  as  Russian  internal  policy towards 
energy companies’ ownership during 2000-2005. In the third section we analyzed 
further evolution of Russian behavior as a gas supplier to the EU during 2004-
2008  concentrating  on  Ukraine-Russian  gas  rows  which  led  to  temporal 
disruptions in gas supplies to the EU. In the fourth section we analyzed mainly 
recent  gas  row  between  Ukraine  and  Russia  which  can  be  regarded  as  an 
existential threat which potentially can lead to the beginning of the securitization 
process of gas supplies to the EU. 
4.1 Preconditions of Politicization
The first major official reaction of the EU on the threats to gas supplies was 
Green Paper  -  Towards a European strategy for  the  security of energy supply 
(European Commission 2000). In such a way the European Union has responded 
to the prospect of growing import dependence. Despite that all serious problems 
occurred during the period of 2000-2009, the Green Paper can serve as a first sign 
of  upcoming process  of  politicization  of  energy supply to  the  EU. Thus,  it  is 
important  to  analyze  conditions  which  lead  to  the  adoption  of  the  above 
mentioned document. 
The first stimulators for growing concerns of security of supplies in the EU 
were  small  disputes  between  Baltic  States,  Belarus,  Ukraine  and  Russia.  The 
transit  of natural  gas exports across Ukraine and Belarus and also problems in 
relations with Baltic States have encountered particular problems in the delivery 
of Russian gas to Europe in the post-Soviet era (after 1991). Russia’s willingness 
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to use its considerable energy resources for political blackmail,  a situation that 
dates back to the Spring of 1990, when Moscow cut energy supplies to the Baltic 
States in a futile attempt to stifle the independence movement. This gas embargo 
provided  a  sharp reminder  of  the strategic  aspects  of  gas  supply relationships 
(Stern 1992: 105). The ‘energy weapon’ was again used against the Baltic States 
in  1992,  in  retaliation  for  Baltic  demands  that  Russia  remove  its  remaining 
military forces from the region (Smith 2006: 2). The Russian policy sought to take 
control of assets in the Ukrainian gas sector in return for debt forgiveness, or to 
press strategic aims outside the gas sphere (Pirani 2007: 19). In 1993 and 1994, 
Russia reduced gas supplies to Ukraine, in part, to force Kyiv to pay for previous 
gas supplies, but also to press Ukraine into ceding more control to Russia over the 
Black Sea Fleet and over Ukraine’s energy infrastructure (D’Anieri 1999: 78-80). 
The basis of the problem still has been a lack of money in Ukraine to pay for 
Russian gas supplies, but in reality the true reason was that the Soviet gas industry 
was born in Ukraine in the 1930s, and the infrastructure was built from there so 
that, Ukraine was still a central part of the gas pipeline network even as the focus 
of activity moved to Western Siberia. Splitting the Soviet Union along Republic 
borders made for an often unworkable allocation of physical assets and nowhere 
was this truer than for gas. The consequence is that vital assets for Gazprom are 
located in Ukraine and thus no longer under its direct control. This policy has led 
to a decade of ‘unauthorized diversions’ by Ukrainian companies of gas in transit 
to  European  customers.  With  very  few  exceptions,  the  transit  difficulties  in 
Ukraine have lasted  only a  few days,  mostly  not  at  times  of peak demand in 
Europe, and European gas companies have managed them relatively easily. The 
most serious desruption in Russian supplies to the EU occured in October 1992, 
when for a period of around ten days supplies to Germany were 20-50% below 
contracted  levels  (Stern  1995:  60).  As  Jonathan  Stern  argue,  the  fact  that 
Turkmenian supplies had been stopped some month previously because of a price 
dispute and that debts of Gazprom had risen to very high levels may explain (but 
does not excuse) Ukrainian actions (Stern 1995: 60). In March 1993 there were 
(unconfirmed) reports of Ukrainian diversions of supplies, but the next confirmed 
events were in September 1993 when gas destined for Romania and Bulgaria was 
reduced substantially. 
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In September 1993, at the height of Ukraine’s economic and political crisis, 
the  Russian government  introduced  into  diplomatic  negotiations  the  linkage 
between the repayment of debts for gas and other issues in dispute. At a summit 
conference  in  Massandra,  Crimea,  Russian  president  Boris  Yeltsin  offered  to 
Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk cancellation of debt in return for control of 
the Black Sea fleet and Ukraine’s nuclear warheads. It appears that Kravchuk had 
agreed in principle to this, but after a strong reaction from politicians in Kiev, the 
idea was abandoned by both sides (D’Anieri 1999: 78-80). 
In February 1994 the debt crisis between Russian and Ukraine again caused 
Russia to  suspend a portion of delivers  to some Ukrainian customers  and this 
again  caused  unauthorized  diversions  which  amounted  to  around  20%  of 
European supplies; importers in France, Germany and Italy registered the fall in 
delivers (Stern 1995:60).
 In the last few weeks of Kravchuk’s presidency (January–February 1994), 
the  issue  of  the  nuclear  warheads  was  settled  separately  under  a  trilateral 
agreement between the US, Ukraine and Russia. The issue of the Black Sea fleet 
lingered and another attempt was made by Russia to swap gas debt forgiveness for 
a pole position in the Ukrainian gas sector. In March 1994, with Russia having 
reduced  gas  exports,  a  Ukrainian  deputy  prime  minister  agreed  with  Russian 
negotiators that Gazprom could take a 51% stake in the pipeline system, but the 
government, supported by parliament, decided against (Balmaceda 1998: 265). In 
order  to  stabilize  the  situation  and  avoid  any  similar  problems  in  the  future, 
Gazprom signed an agreement in April 1994 whereby it would deliver 10 bcm of 
gas to be stored in two Ukrainian facilities for delivery to European customers in 
the  winter  months.  In  addition,  one  of  the  major  Ukrainian  transmission 
companies stated that it would not interfere with gas in transit to Europe (Pirani 
2007: 20-1).
In November 1994 it was reported that delivers to Europe were once again 
reduced.  However,  the  Ukrainians  denied  that  they  had  diverted  the  gas  and 
explained the problem in terms of shortfalls in supplies from Turkmenistan due to 
a pipeline accident in central Asia. But by the first week of December, Ukraine 
acknowledged that it  had responded to Russian cutbacks (because of failure to 
meet debt repayments) by diverting around 20% of European supplies in order to 
keep Ukrainian industries running (Stern 1995: 60-1).
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 In early 1995, a Russian government delegation agreed with the Ukrainian 
government to form a new Russo–Ukrainian company: Gaztransit. Transit assets 
would be concentrated in this company in exchange for the write-off of much of 
Ukraine’s debts to Russia. However, the Ukrainian Parliament first blocked this 
proposal  and  then  went  on  in  November  1995  to  adopt  a  law  prohibiting 
privatization of oil and gas assets altogether. This policy remained in place in the 
gas sector and Russian capital remained absent, whereas significant oil refining 
assets came under Russian control in the late 1990s (Pirani 2007: 20).
Therefore Russian policy clearly goes with state’s main role in maintaining 
security (security of demand). Aggressive policy against Ukraine shows Russian 
aims and principles. From these rather sparse details a few general points also can 
be made: first, so far these episodes have not involved a complete interuptions of 
delivers to the EU, but rather a reduction of delivers which (in one case) reached 
50% of one importer’s  supplies.  Second,  these reductions  can be measured  in 
terms of days and only one episode appears to have exceeded a week. Third, there 
has always been ample warning of these reductions, allowing importers to make 
other arrangements.
As Jonathan Stern pointed out, the diversions tended to take place in spring 
and winter, at times when Ukraine needed to replenish its storages. No diversions 
have taken place during a period of severe weather in Europe when importing gas 
companies  might  be seriously stretched in  terms of supplies  (Stern 1995:  61). 
These factors lead to the possible conclusion that the Ukrainian was prepared to 
use diversions as part  of their  supply management  process – and part  of their 
negotiating process with Russians – but that they were well aware of the impact 
which serious desruption might  have in Europe and would not knowingly risk 
such an event.
Thus,  these  problems  have  been  sufficiently  serious  to  make  importers 
nervous and to have caused minor inconvenience on a small number of occasions. 
While this situation was not satisfactory and showed no sign of being resolved 
swiftly it  cannot  be said to constitute  a major  security threat  to  European gas 
supplies. EU officials were concerned with deepening and widening of European 
integration, signing new integration treaties. They paid little attention to security 
of  supply  in  the  EU.  European  Commission  President  at  that  time  –  Jacques 
Santer in his speech to the European Parliament did not say a word about security 
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of  energy  supply  in  the  EU.  His  main  points  were  enlargement, 
institutionalization, monetary Union issues and implementation of the Maastricht 
Treaty (Santer’s Speech 1995, Santer’s Speech 1996). The Santer Commission 
played  a  major  role  in  several  areas,  first  of  all  in  the  preparations  for  the 
transition  to a  single  currency.  The Council  adopted the name ‘euro’,  and the 
Commission invented the logo €, which consisted of an E for Europe crossed by 
two horizontal lines standing for stability.  Banks and undertakings immediately 
adopted the € on the same basis as the $ and the £. During the Santer Commission 
(1995-1999) there was only one Green Paper which touched EU energy policy 
which was called Energy for the Future: Renewable Sources of Energy. Thus, one 
must  not  talk  about  politicization  process  of  security  of  energy supply before 
2000. Minor problems in gas supply to the EU during 1990s exacerbated impact 
strong enough to make the EU officials start thinking and talking about it and to 
adopt the Green Paper only in 2000. In the new century, after Ukraine had refused 
to transfer control of its gas transmission system to Gazprom and in other words, 
after attempts failed to get control over Ukrainian and Belarus pipelines, Moscow 
took much tougher action.
4.2 Politicization
It is possible to say that the start of the politicization’s process of security of 
energy supply was adopting Green Paper – Towards a European strategy for the 
security of energy supply (European Commission 2000). While the document in 
large  part  consists  of  information  about  trends  in  EU  energy  consumption, 
environmental, issues, it nevertheless contains very important points that actually 
preceded politicization.  The paper describes  external  dependence of the EU in 
terms  of  energy,  extent  of  dependence  and  its  effects  upon  member  states, 
importance of transit states. The most important questions that the green paper 
pose for debate is sounds as follow: Can the European Union accept an increase in 
its dependence on external energy sources without compromising its security of 
supply? And how can we ensure the development and better operation of energy 
transport networks in the European Union and neighboring countries that enable 
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the  internal  market  to  function  properly  and  guarantee  security  of  supply? 
(European Commission 2000).
This document led to a series of debate and discussions between different 
officials  from  state  bodies  and  NGO’s  in  the  EU.  This  resulted  in  series  of 
responses to this paper (for example a group response 2001). Some EU leaders 
carefully argued that Russia was using energy as tool to rich full control over gas 
infrastructure  in Ukraine (Hyde-Price 2007: 149).  Nonetheless,  Russia  remains 
acutely worried that Ukraine might someday join not only the EU, but also NATO 
– bringing US power and influence into Moscow’s front yard.  It has therefore 
continued to put pressure on Ukraine to prevent it from succumbing to US and 
European overtures. This has primarily taken the form of economic pressure over 
gas supplies, which were halted again briefly in December 2000 (Ibid). Despite 
that was the last incident between Russia and Ukraine over gas supplies before 
2006, the EU officials continued to work on its underbelly – gas supplies from 
Russian Federation. In 2004 the European Council adopted Directive 2004/67/EC 
concerning  measures  to  safeguard  security  of  natural  gas  supply.  However,  it 
repeats in some points Commission’s Green Paper of 2000, for example:
“Natural  gas  (gas)  is  becoming  an  increasingly  important  component  in 
Community  energy  supply,  and,  as  indicated  in  the  Green  Paper  ‘Towards  a 
European  strategy  for  the  security  of  energy  supply’,  the  European  Union  is 
expected in the longer term to become increasingly dependent on gas imported 
from non-EU sources of supply.”(European Council 2004)
Nevertheless,  it  clearly shows us that  the EU gives more attention to the 
increase dependency upon external  supplies.  The directive also went further in 
securing gas supply. In Appendix it contains “Non-exhaustive list of instruments 
to enhance the security of gas supply”  which prescribed member states to use 
among other instruments provision of pipeline capacity enabling diversion of gas 
supplies to affected areas and diversification of sources of gas supply (European 
Council 2004). These points can be regarded as direct threat to Russian security of 
demand (Larsson 2007: 61). These concerns are easy to understand since Russian 
state budget is highly dependent upon selling energy and natural gas in particular.
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Thus,  not  accidently,  Russian government  became highly concerned with 
privatization of gas companies which undermine the state capability to use energy 
as a tool in foreign policy. There was mounting evidence that Russia was seeking 
to use its massive energy resources for political purposes. President Putin made no 
secret that he wanted Russia to become a global energy superpower (Milov 2006: 
12).  These  moves  affected  western  and eastern  Europe  as  many countries  are 
completely, or very largely, dependent on Russian energy supplies. The ability to 
diversify energy imports for Europe was limited because there were few secure 
alternative supplies. Energy was likely to remain a key component of EU-Russia 
relations. Still  to counter European Union efforts to diversify its energy sources 
Russian  government  needs  to  control  or  to  posses  gas  companies  as  much  as 
possible. 
The  discussions  on the possibility  of  Russian  use of  energy as  a  tool  in 
international politics began with the move towards greater state interference in the 
energy  sector  in  2003-4  (Milov  2006:  12).  Before  that  period,  the  Russian 
authorities, at least officially, had been promoting different types of policies with 
regard  to  the  energy  sector,  including  further  privatization,  liberalization,  and 
international integration of the Russian energy sector. In 2000-2001, plans were 
announced to liberalize prices and privatize large assets in power generation, oil 
and gas companies. Between 2000 and 2002, several of the major oil stocks were 
privatized, including ONACO, VNK, and Slavneft. Further privatization plans in 
the energy sector were announced, and the government had developed promising 
partnerships with private energy companies with regard to development of new 
infrastructure projects (e.g. a new oil pipeline from East Siberian city of Angarsk 
to Chinese Daqing, promoted by oil company Yukos) (Smith 2006: 2).
The  change  in  attitude  began  in  early  2003  when  the  state  refused  to 
privatize the last major state-owned oil company, Rosneft, which was the initial 
intention of the reformers in the Kremlin. If Rosneft was privatized, the share of 
state-linked oil companies in oil production would have fallen from just below 
15% in 2002 to well below 10%, leading to nearly full private ownership of the oil 
production sector. But others in the Kremlin were keen to see Rosneft develop as 
a national oil company (Milov 2006: 12).
To achieve this goal, it needed to expand as its assets were limited. Such 
expansion began with the controversial acquisition by Rosneft of the oil company 
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Severnaya  Neft.  Through this takeover, Rosneft gained support from important 
decision-makers in the Kremlin. The takeover also led to an escalation of relations 
between the management of Rosneft and Yukos. At the same time, the political 
wing  of  the  Yukos  attack  had  been  escalating,  Rosneft  had  pursued  further 
attempts  to  acquire  certain  oil  assets  in  Eastern  Siberia,  which  had  included 
certain  legal  disputes  with  Yukos  (Smith  2006:  2).  A certain  momentum had 
started to develop around Rosneft that  had a lot to do with establishment of a 
more  powerful  state-linked  oil  company through a  new wave of  mergers  and 
acquisitions of private businesses. But the expansion of the state-owned Russian 
energy sector  did not  end here.  In early  2003, Russian authorities  had clearly 
denied the possibility of constructing a privately owned 1-2.5 million barrels per 
day (mbd) export oil pipeline from Western Siberia to Murmansk, as suggested by 
four Russian private oil companies (Lukoil, Yukos, TNK and Sibneft) (Muller-
Kraenner 2008: 43-44) which were searching for ways to resolve the problem of 
limited Russian oil pipeline export capacities in order to support oil production 
and exports growth. The market restructuring of vertically integrated monopoly 
Gazprom, which was on the reformers’ agenda during the first years of Putin’s 
presidency, was officially banned by President Putin himself. It was replaced with 
quite the opposite intention to formally buy back state control in Gazprom. Power 
sector reform that had included liberalization and privatization plans had clearly 
slowed down (Milov 2006: 13).
The Russian biggest oil company Yukos was nationalized by the state in late 
2004, when the key oil production asset of Yukos, Yuganskneftegaz, was taken 
out of the company through court decision and, after a controversial ‘auction’ in 
December 2004, ended up under the control of Rosneft.  At the same time, the 
merger  of  Gazprom and Rosneft  had  been  announced.  Although it  had  never 
turned into reality, the state had formally bought back the controlling equity stake 
in  Gazprom in December  2005 and now effectively controls  over  50% of the 
company  (Monaghan  2007:  4).  Since  2004,  the  state  had  been  officially 
prohibiting the construction of private trunk oil and gas pipelines, and had openly 
announced  its  intention  to  prohibit  foreign  ownership  of  50%  and  more  in 
companies developing ‘strategic’ oil and gas fields (Belkin 2008: 85).
In late 2005, Gazprom had bought back the 95% stake in Sibneft. In early 
2006, Yukos bankruptcy procedures had started, before which Rosneft apparently 
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bought a large part of Yukos’ debt. Now, during the bankruptcy procedures, it acts 
as the key creditor of the company – which means that the company is set for 
more new acquisitions.
Thus,  obviously,  Russia’s  assertive  energy diplomacy cannot  be  delinked 
from the abuse of good governance and market principles internally.  Far from 
breaking up Gazprom, as he originally promised, Putin has come increasingly to 
rely  on  and  support  the  latter  as  a  vehicle  for  projecting  Russian  influence 
(Monaghan 2007: 6). The political backing for Gazprom has certainly sufficed to 
give the latter a striking international self-confidence (Youngs 2008: 12).
4.3 EU’s growing concerns
The  new  wave  of  problems  came  in  2004  when  Russia  suspended  gas 
supplies to Belarus. This row provoked lots criticism of Russian energy policy 
and  Russian  political  tools.  Scholars  argue  that  this  conflict  contribute  to 
politicization of energy supplies (Radoman 2007: 36). But besides gas conflicts 
with transit countries Russia also acted in another sphere to reach its security of 
demand – blocking other ways for diversification of energy supplies to the EU.
In 2004 Russia continued to use energy as a tool of political  pressure to 
Belarus, and as a consequence Poland and Lithuania suffered supply disruptions 
in 2004 from the Kremlin’s politically motivated attempt to take over Belarus’ gas 
pipeline system (Smith 2006: 2). In January 2004, after failing to reach agreement 
with  Belarus  leaders  on control  of  Belarus  gas  pipeline  company Beltransgas, 
Gazprom switched off gas supplies at the start of the calendar year, arguing that 
the old contract had expired and Belarus had not accepted new price conditions 
for Russian gas supply to Belarus (Muller-Kraenner 2008: 48). The price issue 
was  always  used  as  a  key  public  explanation;  however,  during  negotiations, 
Moscow had clearly indicated that increasing gas supply prices would be held 
back if Belarus became more flexible over the pipeline control issue. The supply 
disruption brought an immediate response from the Belarus government that had 
began  redirecting  gas  supply  to  the  wider  European  market  to  its  domestic 
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(Belarus) market, so disrupting supply to gas consumers in Lithuania, Poland and 
even Germany (Milov 2006: 16).
The important lesson from this story is the obvious evidence of the mutual 
interdependence of Russia and the transit countries: there are no mechanisms for 
protecting the transit  stability of Russian gas to Europe should there be major 
disagreements between Russia and transit countries. In the Belarus case, Gazprom 
was  forced  to  switch  the  gas  back  on  because  it  had  no  counter  to  Belarus 
government actions to redirect Russian transit gas to Belarus consumers.
Legally, Gazprom’s position had been always very weak, since it has been 
basing all its energy relations on the post-Soviet space on bilateral government-to-
government agreements, rather than on a clear international legal regime with a 
fair system for dispute resolution. From a pure legal point of view, it is very hard 
to prove that Belarus’ actions violated any legal terms.
 In  late  December  2005,  Russia’s  gas  monopoly,  Gazprom,  again 
temporarily suspended gas flows to Ukraine as part of a dispute over gas price 
increases.  Within  hours  of  the  shutoff,  several  European  countries,  including 
Austria, Italy, Poland, and Germany, reported drops in their own pipeline pressure 
by as much as 30 percent. The gas crisis lasted only a few days, and after Russia 
and Ukraine reached an agreement on gas prices, gas was flowing normally again.
In  January  2006,  Russia  repeated  the  gas  supply  cut-off  scenario  with 
supplies to Ukraine. Again, European consumers suffered, but this time on a much 
larger scale: shortages of gas were felt in a dozen countries, including Germany 
and Italy. Again, after a few days, Moscow was forced to switch the gas back on 
as,  again,  there  no  mechanisms  for  protecting  transit  security  in  the  event  of 
soured  relations  with  the  transit  country,  and  Europeans  quickly  showed their 
negative reaction to Gazprom’s action (Pirani 2009: 2). Some scholars argue that 
from that point the politicization process entered in its final stage (Radoman 2007: 
38-39).  The  reaction  of  the  EU  to  the  brief  halt  to  Russian  gas  supplies  in 
2006/2007 is  witness to the possible  consequences of the politicization of this 
matter. Russia was accused of using her energy supplies as a tool with which to 
intimidate other states in order to achieve her foreign policy goals. Even though 
Russia described these actions as exclusively economic in nature, the countries 
that they affected assessed them as being a device with which to achieve not only 
economic but also political aims (Radoman 2007: 39).
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Both cases seem to prove that,  first – Russia is quite ready to use supply 
disruption as an instrument for achieving certain political goals, and, second, that 
knowing  of  the  difficulty  of  resolving  the  long-term  problem  (reliability  of 
transit),  Russia  is  ready  to  ignore  the  long-term  consequences  of  short-term 
demonstrative use of force. References to the desire to ‘transfer to market pricing’ 
in  relations  with  the  post-Soviet  countries  seem  irrelevant.  First,  there  is  no 
transparent international market price of gas, and the conditions of the long-term 
wholesale  gas  supply  contracts  between  Gazprom  and  Western  European 
countries are so confidential  that  they cannot be referred to as ‘market  prices’ 
since information on prices under these contracts  is not publicly available  and 
cannot be independently verified.
Second, by no means can one call a firm price (not the market-linked price 
formula,  but  the  specific  firm  price)  as  stated  in  a  contract  between  two 
government-owned  companies  a  ‘market’  price.  Third,  the  ‘weight’  of  the 
importance  of  transit  conditions  seem,  in  reality,  to  matter  much  more  to 
Gazprom, particularly in the Ukrainian case: while gas supply volumes make up 
just about 20 bcm (billion cubic metres) of Russian gas, the transit volume makes 
up to 130 bcm of Russian gas, nearly all European exports.
In this case, transit topics and fees should matter much more to Gazprom 
than the price of gas supply to Ukraine. This was even officially recognized by 
one of Gazprom’s deputy CEOs, A.Ryazanov, at a briefing on 7 June 2005 in 
Moscow,  when  he  described  previous  agreements  with  Ukraine  as  ‘very 
advantageous’, despite low supply prices, because Gazprom had been provided 
with one of the lowest gas transit fares in Europe (Milov 2006: 16).
So,  if  the  issue  was  about  prices,  the  best  approach  should  have  been 
negotiation and legal dispute resolution. But Moscow had demonstrably ignored 
the opportunity for negotiations, insisting on tripling gas supply prices to Ukraine. 
When  Kyiv  showed some signs  of  being  willing  to  negotiate  price  increases, 
Russia then lifted the previous price by 4½ times. The Kremlin clearly wanted to 
flex its muscles. The crisis was temporarily settled on 4 January 2006 when a 
controversial  agreement  was signed between Russia and Ukraine,  under which 
both  parties  agreed  to  transfer  certain  rights  to  a  mysterious  intermediary, 
Rosukrenergo. Gazprom had given Rosukrenergo the opportunity for re-export of 
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15  bcm  of  gas  imported  from  Kazakhstan  and  Uzbekistan,  and  which  was 
completely owned by Gazprom beforehand (Muller-Kraenner 2008: 39).
Rosukrenergo, under a new agreement, had also received very advantageous 
conditions  for  transit  and  use  of  underground  storage  facilities  on  Ukrainian 
territory. There were also prospects for access to Ukrainian end-user supplies. The 
ownership structure is unclear, but it appears that, one way or another, certain top 
policy makers in both Russia and Ukraine are somehow involved as beneficiaries 
of the company. This is another form of ‘political engagement’ which is probably 
part  of  broader  tactics  about  the post-Soviet  space.  Through such individually 
beneficial  agreements,  the  Kremlin  can  ensure  that  some  top  politicians  in 
neighbouring countries are under some control by Moscow (Milov 2006: 17).
The agreement did not settle the fundamental problem as the level of prices 
that  as  been  set  expires  on  1st  July 2006,  and  there  is  pressure  from various 
Ukraine politicians calling for review of the agreement. Rosukrenergo’s access to 
Ukrainian  gas  end-users  precedes  slowly,  many  important  issues  in  Russia-
Ukraine gas relations have not actually been touched by the agreement, and, in 
general,  the  lack  of  mutual  trust  between  the  two  countries  cannot  create  a 
sustainable  agreement  based on individual  interest.  So,  one can expect  further 
turbulence in gas relations between Russia and Ukraine, particularly anticipated 
political  developments  such as  Ukraine’s  expected  membership  of  NATO this 
autumn.
The Belarus situation also appears to be approaching a second crisis points. 
When Russia pressed Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, the Baltic states and Armenia 
to accept increased gas export prices (to above $100 per bcm at the end of 2005), 
Belarus was seemingly treated differently.  Gazprom had agreed to retain a gas 
price of about $47 per bcm, considered by many as a sort of ‘political  loyalty 
reward’.  But,  after  the  presidential  elections  of  March  2006  which  re-elected 
Alexandr Lukashenko, Gazprom demanded that the gas supply price for Belarus 
should rise to above $200 per bcm from 1st January, 2007, and that control of 
Beltransgas  should  be  transferred  to  Gazprom.  It  is  difficult  to  believe  that 
Lukashenko  would  accept  such  conditions,  and  Gazprom  again  want  any 
mechanism for protecting European gas transit in the event supplies to Belarus are 
cut (Milov 2006 : 18). In January 2007 the gas supply to Belarus was also cut as 
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she failed to comply with the demand that she pay four times more than the 47 
dollars per unit of as she was paying until then (Radoman 2007: 40).
Thus,  we can see that  Russia  tries  to  do its  best  to get  control  over  gas 
infrastructure in transit countries. This gives very persuasive grounds for the EU 
to believe Russia is absolutely ready to use its energy power as a weapon to reach 
certain aims in foreign policy. These conclusions testify about the existence of so 
called ‘energy dilemma’ for the EU. While it tries to make gas supplies secure 
through decreasing its dependency from Russia in the issue, Russia in its turn tries 
to guarantee security of demand for itself in the EU through depriving the former 
to use other sources of natural gas than Russian.
As it was argued in the beginning of the section this is not the only way 
Russia threaten EU’s security of supplies. Even if the Russian Federation gain 
control over gas pipelines in Ukraine and Belarus the EU can still make itself less 
dependent (or even completely independent) from Russian gas supplies through 
alternative pipelines for example Nabucco (Muller-Kraenner 2008: 48). Since this 
pipeline is supposed to go through Hungary and Balkan countries Russia tries to 
get  control  also over  gas  markets  in  these countries.  Gazprom’s  strategy is  to 
establish permanent control of the Hungary/Balkans markets before Caspian gas 
can reach them through the proposed Nabucco pipeline (Belkin 2008: 86). Some 
scholars believe that Gazprom will try to convince other nations that agreed to 
fund the Nabucco pipeline to withdraw their commitments and rely on the South 
Stream pipeline instead. South stream pipeline will, if completed, ling Bulgaria 
via Serbia and Hungary with one of Europe’s major gas hubs in Austria. Russia 
has already signed bilateral agreements with Serbia, a traditional ally, and the EU 
member state Hungary. South Stream directly competes with the EU sponsored 
Nabucco  pipeline  project.  Two  trans-Balkan  gas  pipelines  will  not  be 
economically feasible. Therefore the geopolitical tug of war between Russia and 
the EU continues (Muller-Kraenner 2008: 48).
But despite alternative pipelines there also another way for the EU to get gas 
– liquefied natural gas transported by ships from Northern Africa namely Algeria 
and from Latin America. The EU already gets some part of its imported natural 
gas from Algeria and it is possible to increase volumes. But Russian energy giants 
have  even  begun  poaching  on  foreign  territories.  In  June  2006,  for  instance, 
Gazprom announced that it would invest up to two billion dollars in the natural 
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gas industry of Bolivia in the Andes Mountains, which had only recently been 
nationalized by force. Negotiations over compensation with the former investors 
from Spain and neighboring Brazil had not even been finalized. Gazprom wishes 
to become active in Algeria and Libya as well, traditionally the region of French, 
Italian and German companies (Muller-Kraenner 2008: 49).
The last option for the EU to diversify its gas supplies is Iranian gas. Despite 
political instability this option attracted the EU since Iran had the second largest 
gas reserves after Russia and was able to give considerable amounts of natural gas 
to  the  EU.  But  again  this  threat  to  Russian  gas  exports  was  quite  skillfully 
neutralized by Gazprom. On 15 June 2006, Putin announced at a conference in 
Shanghai that he would support the construction of a new gas pipeline from Iran 
via Pakistan to China. Iran could then direct it gas supplies instead of the EU to 
China and would no longer be a competitor to Russia (Muller-Kraenner 2008: 51). 
In such a way Russia can ensure its control over the gas market of Central and 
Southern  Asia  through  merging  of  the  Iranian  and  the  Russian  gas  pipeline 
network.
 The halt of gas supplies to the Ukraine and Belarus has been evaluated, both 
by analysts and EU officials, as a signal from Moscow that it won’t benevolently 
sit by and watch the change in foreign-policy orientation of the countries of the 
former Soviet Union (Radoman 2007: 40). Moscow has, however, described its 
actions as being wholly of an economic nature. The announced price-increases 
mark the end of an era (since 1990) during which the countries of the former-
Soviet  Union could buy their oil  and gas from Moscow for price significantly 
below that dictated by the market. The Russian ministers of finance and economy 
endeavored to keep the debate within the economic playing field by emphasizing 
that  the  price  increases  are  of  economic,  and not  political,  significance  (Putin 
2006). They highlighted that one of the conditions for the acceptance of Russia 
into the World Trade Organization is  the harmonization  of energy prices  with 
those on international markets by 2011. The increase of gas prices within Russia, 
they claim, cannot possibly come before the increase of prices for neighboring 
countries  which,  until  recently,  were  paying  significantly  lower  prices  (Putin 
2006). At the same time, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, endeavored to 
convince his European colleagues that Russia is a dependable partner to the EU, 
that stability and predictability of the system of energy security is in the interests 
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of both parties. Also that,  “Russia will use the market, and not politics, as the 
basis for its relations with all countries.” (Radoman 2007: 40).
 In  this  fashion  the  politicization  of  the  problem  has  been  a  factor  in 
contributing to the situation in which energy security is discussed on two levels 
(economic and political), using both economic and political arguments and with 
divergent interpretations of the concept of energy security. For the countries of the 
European Union,  security of supply would be achieved if  Russia would allow 
foreign companies access to its resources and if she would allow competition in 
her  energy  sector,  which  is  currently,  dominated  by  Gazprom  and  Rosneft. 
Conversely,  for  Russia  security  of  demand  would  be  achieved  by  obtaining 
control over gas infrastructure around the EU – mainly Belarus and Ukraine, but 
also Hungary and Balkans.  It  also becomes  active  participant  in gas  issues  in 
Northern Africa. As conflicts during 1991-2007 show Russia does its best to reach 
this goal. Attempts to attain security of demand by Russian Federation coincided 
(not accidently) with EU’s attempts to diversify its gas supplies. Thus, so far EU 
attempts to make energy supplies from Russia secure did not give any positive 
result in EU-Russia relations. Moreover it is possible to argue that those attempts 
only contribute to cold confrontation between the EU and Russia in the energy 
issue.
4.4 Securitization?
The most recent and probably the most serious threat to the gas supplies to 
the EU was the last gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine in December 2008- 
January 2009. This incident can be regarded as the one which can lead directly to 
securitization of gas supplies in the EU. This time the disruption was the longest 
one and affected seriously several  member  states  in  the EU. The row deserve 
special attention since it can clearly shows current tendencies in Russian foreign 
policy  in  the  sphere  of  energy and possible  consequences  for  the  EU foreign 
policy in the area of gas supplies.
The  dispute  between  Gazprom  and  Naftohaz Ukrainy  grew  intense  in 
November–December 2008 over old debts and new prices. By New Year’s Eve, 
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no agreement for gas deliveries from Russia to Ukraine in 2009 was in place. The 
Russian  side  used  this  situation  as  a  justification  to  diminish  gas  volumes 
delivered to Ukraine,  seeking to send Europe’s gas through the pipeline while 
depriving  Ukraine  of  any  flows  (Westphal  2009:  15).  In  the  following  days, 
mutual recriminations resulted in a deadlock, and from 6–7 January on, the gas 
pipelines  went  dry.  Only  on  19  January,  both  sides  announced  that  they  had 
resolved the dispute (Pirani 2009: 3). 
But was the row solely about the prices and debts? We believe that there 
were some hidden motives behind it. 
It is necessary to know that during 2008 Ukraine conducted its foreign policy 
in “anti-Russian” direction. It declared its will to join NATO and nevertheless it 
got  temporal  negative  response  on  NATO  Bucharest  Summit  in  April  2008, 
Ukrainian  politicians  continued  to  confirm  Ukraine’s  readiness  to  join  the 
organization (Myers  2008). No wonder that  such actions bothered the Russian 
Federation  which  warned Ukraine  against  joining  NATO and even threatened 
with redirecting missiles towards Ukraine (Ryan 2008).
Despite  NATO  ambitions  Ukraine  also  required  from  Russia  to  start 
preparation to withdraw its Black Sea from Ukrainian territory. According to the 
Russian-Ukrainian agreement signed in 1997 Russian Black Sea fleet may stay in 
Sevastopol (Crimea, Ukraine) till 2017. But the closer the date is the more often 
Russian politicians argue for prolongation of the agreement. Logically Ukrainian 
demand  provoked  much  of  discontent  among  Russian  state  leaders  (Oxford 
Analytica 2008).
Finally,  Ukraine  supplied  Georgia  with  weapon  before  the  war  in  South 
Osetiya began. This well-known fact since it was done officially. Nevertheless it 
contributed  to  discontent  among  Russian  state  leaders  by  Ukrainian  foreign 
policy.
Thus, during 2008 Ukraine gave enough grounds for Russia to apply severe 
measures to Ukraine during the gas conflict.  The Russian behavior can also be 
explained  in  a  way  that  people  in  the  Russian  government  hope  that,  by 
embroiling Europe in the dispute, a new modus operandi can be established for 
the Ukrainian pipeline system (Pirani 2009: 4). Much of what Europeans usually 
term Russian  supply  risk  is  actually  Ukrainian  transit  risk,  and  that  concerns 
Moscow. Ukraine’s readiness to divert gas bound for Europe, as it did in 2006, 
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has been a trump card in negotiations. On the one hand, Russian suggestions that 
Ukraine might relinquish control over the system to pay its gas debts, as Belarus 
did, meet blanket and understandable political opposition in Kiev. On the other, 
Naftogaz has failed to raise money to refurbish the system, and struggles even to 
maintain it.  Gazprom managers,  in response to what they see as an intractable 
obstacle,  after  2006 pressed ahead with projects such as the North Stream and 
South Stream pipelines,  aimed at reducing transit  dependence on Ukraine.  But 
these won’t be ready for three more years at best, and won’t cut out Ukraine all 
together even then. For Moscow, control of the Ukrainian network remains the 
favored option.
Therefore,  even  the  recent  Russian-Ukrainian  gas  row  shows  Russian 
readiness to use natural  gas as tool in foreign policy.  As some scholars argue 
Russia that Ukrainian gas infrastructure remains attractive for Russia.
The EU reaction on gas disruption was quite fast and decisive. During his 
speeches  before  the  European  Parliament  the  President  of  the  Commission 
emphasized several times the necessity to take immediate and effective measures 
to  solve  the  problem of  gas  supplies  for  the  EU. What  it  was  a  first  step  of 
securitization or final step in politicization is a question for another work. But 
mentioned  measures  were  taken  and it  is  possible  to  call  them extraordinary. 
Thus, the process of securitization of gas supplies was started.
On March 23 2009 President Barroso at the Conference on modernization of 
Ukraine’s  Gas  Transit  System  clearly  expressed  EU’s  readiness  for  serious 
measures to be taken:
“So I am very glad to say that the Commission, the Government of Ukraine and 
representatives of three International Financial Institutions – the EIB, the EBRD 
and the World Bank – will shortly sign a joint declaration to move forward together 
on the key tasks of reforming the Ukrainian gas sector to bring it into the EU’s 
internal  energy  market  and  for  modernising  the  Ukraine  gas  transit  network” 
(Barroso 2009).
The Declaration was signed and it is not difficult to predict Russia’s reaction 
after  it  was  not  invited  to  participate  in  discussions  and  final  signing  of  the 
Declaration.  Very  shortly  after  the  document  was  signed  Gazprom demanded 
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European cooperation on the Ukrainian gas sector, saying the transit system was 
inextricably linked to Russian export markets (United Press International 2009). 
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin expressed outrage over the EU-Ukraine 
deal, saying it may be time to review relations with Europe (Ibid). The current 
economic  crises  makes  Russia  more  concerned  about  EU-Ukraine  deal  and 
probably even hostile towards the project since it is unlikely that Gazprom will be 
able to afford the $20 billion South Stream project, and Nord Stream is also under 
financial pressure (Riley 2009). Thus, extraordinary measures taken by the EU to 
make gas supplies secure, inevitably make Russia to take appropriate measures to 
secure gas demand which is extremely important for Russia as its foreign policy 
during 1991-2009 in this area shows. One may wrongly suppose that Russia has 
nothing to response with to the EU’s measures like signing gas deal with Ukraine. 
Russia has threatened to reroute its supplies eastwards, towards China and Japan. 
This is partly an empty threat, as Russia lacks the transport capacity to do so in 
the short-term perspective. However, it might have an impact on the margin and 
in the medium-term perspective Larsson 2007: 10).
When it comes to the last alternative the EU can use – Iranian gas, Russia is 
also maintaining its presence here. On July 13 2008 Iran and Russia's Gazprom 
signed  energy  cooperation  deal,  according  to  which  Russia  will  help  Tehran 
develop its oil and gas fields (AFP 2008). So, in that area still there is not much 
room left for the EU to negotiate. 2006 Russian-Iranian gas deal (see section 4.3) 
and the new agreement signed in 2008 ensured stable Russian influence in the 
region leaving the EU outside Iranian gas supplies. 
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5 Conclusions
This  paper  is  an  attempt  to  analyze  securitization  of  gas  supply  and  its 
possible consequences. As a case we have analyzed gas supplies from Russian 
federation to the EU starting from 1991 and tried to predict possible consequences 
of securitization of the gas supply by the EU for EU-Russia relation in the sphere 
of  gas  supply  and  demand.  A  theoretical  framework  was  created  where  we 
explained  and  to  some  degree  elaborated  on  essential  concepts  of  security  in 
general, securitization, security of supply and security of demand. We have also 
explained so called ‘energy dilemma’ in theoretical framework section.
In  the  analysis  chapter  we  found  out  that  Russia  was  ready  to  use  and 
actually used energy as a tool in foreign policy  during 1991-2000 to regain the 
control over former Soviet gas infrastructure and pressed former Soviet republics 
such as Ukraine and Belarus to compel them to relinquish gas infrastructure. Such 
behavior provoked worries in the EU which resulted in adopting Green Paper –
Towards  a  European  strategy  for  the  security  of  energy  supply  (European 
Commission 2000). This document led to numerous debates over the issue that 
can be considered as a stimulus for politicization of gas supplies to the EU.
We found out that while the EU tried to take government decision and to 
diversify its gas import  during 2000-2005, Russia strengthened its control over 
gas production inside the country by nationalizing gas companies. We came to 
conclusion that these events were interconnected. In other words EU’s attempts to 
diversify its gas supply led only to increase of Russian decisiveness in gaining 
control  over  gas  infrastructure  around  the  EU  and  nationalizing  private  gas 
companies in Russia.
During  2004-2008  Russia  concentrated  on  gaining  control  over  gas 
infrastructures in former Soviet republics mainly in Ukraine. Gas rows between 
Russia and Belarus/Ukraine which led to temporal disruptions of gas supplies to 
the EU gives  us  a  good example  of using energy as a  tool  in  foreign policy. 
Moreover, after the EU started developing other ways to get natural gas Gazprom 
increased its presence in the respective areas, trying to make gas demand secure. 
Again, EU actions on decreasing gas dependency from Russian gas supplies as a 
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result of politicization led only to increasing ‘cold’ confrontation between Russia 
and the EU.
The recent gas row between Ukraine and Russia, which can be regarded as 
an existential threat to gas supplies to the EU, can lead to direct securitization of 
the issue and extraordinary measures. The EU is already taken a measure that goes 
outside  of  normal  politics  –  signed  a  gas  deal  with  Ukraine  on  including 
Ukrainian  gas  infrastructure  into  EUs  and  incorporating  Ukraine  into  EU’s 
internal energy market. This provoked discontent among Russian politicians and 
even threats to review EU-Russian relations in the sphere of energy. 
Thus, we would argue that securitization being described as a bad thing by 
the authors of securitization theory (Buzan et al 1998: 29) can lead to negative 
consequences  in  case  if  EU gas  supplies  are  securitized.  Analysis  of  Russian 
foreign policy during 1991-2009 clearly shows us its main principles. The most 
vital thing in the sphere of gas exports for Russia appears security of demand. The 
analysis  shows  that  Russian  Federation  can  easily  use  energy  as  a  tool  in 
achieving that thing. Therefore securitizing of gas supply by the EU and taking 
extraordinary  measures  can  lead  only  to  prolongation  of  EU-Russia  gas 
confrontation  and  even  deterioration  of  bilateral  relations.  Since  at  least  in 
medium-time perspective Russia can redirect its gas exports from Western Europe 
to Asia (China mainly) and leave the EU without gas supplies the EU should treat 
the securitization of the issue very carefully and probably even abstaining from it. 
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6 Suggestions for further research
The work can serve as a good foundation for further research. First of all, the 
paper can be used in elaborating on securitization and its consequences. It can 
serve both as an empirical  evidence of negative consequences of securitization 
and as theoretical explanation. Since the paper is a case study its results can not be 
applicable in other cases but it can be used in comparative study of securitization 
consequences. But mainly the work can serve as a ground in analysing remedies 
to EU’s gas dependency from Russia. For example one of the possible ways for 
the  EU to  solve  the  problem may  lie  within  the  sphere  of  normal  politics  – 
cooperation  with  Russia.  The  EU may act  like  Russia  when  it  neutralized  its 
competitor  –  Iran.  The EU can propose Russia  financing  Russian-Chinese gas 
pipeline  in  return  of  cessation  of  Russian  presence  on  Algerian  and/or  Latin 
American gas markets.
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